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The FMA and the Constitutional Validity of 
Magistrate Judges’ Authority to Accept Felony 
Guilty Pleas 
ABSTRACT 
Given the burdens of a growing district court caseload and the fact that 
over 97% of criminal convictions result in guilty pleas, efficiency has 
necessitated an expanding role for magistrate judges.  Within that 
expanded role lies a greater need for delegation to magistrate judges to 
assist in the practice of guilty plea acceptance.  The Federal Magistrates 
Act (FMA) permits magistrate judges to take on additional duties so long 
as they are “not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United 
States.”  Despite the language of the FMA, the Seventh Circuit has been 
the first circuit to deny district courts the option to delegate the acceptance 
of plea agreements to magistrates.  Therefore, the key question on which 
this Comment focuses is whether the FMA permits magistrate judges to 
personally accept guilty pleas.  This Comment answers this question 
through an analysis of the history of the FMA, the relevant case law, as 
well as a comparative discussion between the Seventh Circuit and its sister 
circuits.  Ultimately, this Comment proposes that the FMA should be read 
to permit federal magistrates the power to accept guilty pleas, consistent 
with the jurisprudence of the several circuits and the Constitution. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Magistrates Act (FMA)1 has long been read to give a 
broader role to federal magistrate judges in the nearly fifty years since its 
passage.  As a result of that expansive interpretation, federal magistrate 
judges enjoy many of the same powers and duties as their Article III 
counterparts.  The FMA permits magistrate judges to take on additional 
duties so long as they are “not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws 
of the United States.”2  The FMA specifically authorizes magistrate judges 
 
 1. Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631–639 (2012). 
 2. Id. § 636; see also Brendan Linehan Shannon, Note, The Federal Magistrates Act: 
A New Article III Analysis for a New Breed of Judicial Officer, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
253, 253 (1991) (“[S]ince Congress passed the Act, congressional amendment of the law 
and expansive judicial interpretation have resulted in a new breed of judicial officer.”). 
1
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to preside over certain matters, including civil and misdemeanor trials.3  
Beyond the capacity to decide motions, hear evidence, and instruct juries, 
several federal courts of appeals have concluded that federal magistrates 
also have the power to accept guilty pleas in felony cases, a task that is 
arguably comparable to that of a guilty plea colloquy.4  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however, recently held that the 
Federal Magistrates Act does not permit magistrate judges to accept guilty 
pleas even when the parties consent.5  The Seventh Circuit is the first 
circuit to deny district courts the option to delegate the acceptance of plea 
agreements to magistrates.6 
There were over 300,000 cases filed in the federal district courts in 
2014, over 70,000 of which were criminal proceedings.7  The FMA was 
passed by Congress to ease the rapidly increasing and “overwhelming 
caseload” burden of many district courts.8  In 2013, over 97% of criminal 
convictions in the United States District Courts were the result of guilty 
pleas.9  With the overburdening caseload of federal district courts, there is a 
greater need for delegation to magistrate judges to assist in the practice of 
guilty plea acceptance.10  Such delegation is in line with many long 
recognized duties; magistrate judges are already permitted to preside over 
many unspecified aspects of a felony criminal proceeding such as jury 
selection and the plea colloquy.11  While these duties are not enumerated 
under the FMA, the United States Supreme Court has held these additional 
duties to be consistent with Constitution.12  Accepting a felony guilty plea 
is comparable to conducting a plea colloquy and involves far less discretion 
 
 3. 28 U.S.C. § 636. 
 4. See United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 432 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 5. United States v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886, 887 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 6. T.J. Hales, Note, Federal Criminal Procedure—Guilty Plea Satisfaction 
Guaranteed, 68 SMU L. REV. 283, 283 (2015). 
 7. U.S. District Courts Combined Civil and Criminal Federal Court Management 
Statistics, in FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS 1 (Dec. 31, 2014), http://
www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/na/federal-court-management-statistics/2014/12/31-2. 
 8. United States v. Khan, 774 F. Supp. 748, 750 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 9. See U.S. District Courts Criminal Statistical Tables For The Federal Judiciary 
Table D-4, in STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 1 (Dec. 31, 2013), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/2013/d
ecember/D04Dec13.pdf (finding that of 84,060 total criminal convictions in a twelve-month 
period, 81,955 were the result of guilty pleas). 
 10. See Harden, 758 F.3d at 891 (explaining the desire to promote efficiency in the 
district courts and the prevalence of guilty pleas today). 
 11. See id. 
 12. Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 931–33 (1991). 
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than presiding over jury selection.13  The comparability of felony guilty 
pleas to the permitted duties under the FMA makes accepting felony guilty 
pleas an additional duty consistent with the Constitution and laws of the 
United States.14 
In line with the Supreme Court’s determination that federal 
magistrates should be permitted additional, unspecified duties, this 
Comment argues that the FMA should be read to permit federal magistrates 
to accept guilty pleas in felony cases where the parties consent, thereby 
absolving any potential constitutional violation.  Specifically, the key 
question on which this Comment focuses is whether the FMA permits 
magistrate judges to go farther and personally accept guilty pleas and find 
the defendant guilty—a dispositive step in the criminal process—rather 
than making a recommendation to the district court judge.  In the interest of 
judicial efficiency, there are means by which federal district courts can 
ensure that defendants are thoroughly informed and aware of the 
dispositive action should they consent, which is the primary concern raised 
by opponents of the extended power. 
Part I of this Comment provides background information on the FMA 
and the relevant precedent of the Supreme Court of the United States.  In 
Part II, this Comment examines the existing case law from the different 
circuits on this issue to provide the reasoning behind courts’ allowance or 
disallowance of magistrate judges to accept felony guilty pleas.  Part II-A 
examines the Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit determinations that 
federal magistrates may accept felony guilty pleas, while Part II-B 
discusses the Seventh Circuit’s recent departure from this reasoning.  
Finally, Part III weighs the two approaches and concludes that the FMA 
should be read to permit federal magistrates the power to accept guilty 
pleas, consistent with the jurisprudence of the several circuits and the 
Constitution. 
I. THE FMA: CONGRESS’ INTENT AND THE SUPREME COURT’S 
INTERPRETATION 
Article III, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution vests the judicial power 
in “one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish.”15  The Supreme Court has 
interpreted this provision to limit Congress’s ability to vest judicial 
 
 13. United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 432 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 14. Id. 
 15. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
3
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authority in non-Article III judges.16  Accordingly, magistrate judges are 
not explicitly listed in Article III but instead are statutorily created.17  The 
FMA, which was passed by Congress to ease the rapidly increasing and 
overwhelming caseload burden of many district courts, defines the scope of 
magistrate judges’ authority.18 
In many districts, magistrate judges hear guilty pleas and then, as a 
matter of procedure, make a recommendation to the district court judge, 
who then decides whether to accept the guilty plea and find the defendant 
guilty.19  Ultimately, however, federal magistrate judges can accept felony 
guilty pleas because the acceptance of a felony guilty plea is a comparable 
duty to others enumerated under the FMA.20 
In order to understand the FMA and felony guilty pleas in general, it is 
essential to understand the plea process as set out in Rule 11 of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure.21  Before a magistrate judge can administer 
the plea and sentencing under Rule 11, the defendant must consent to the 
magistrate judge’s jurisdiction, and the district judge must assign the case 
to the magistrate judge for the taking of the plea.22  This is because the 
magistrate judge, unlike the Article III district court judge, is not explicitly 
vested with the authority to hear these proceedings.23  Once these steps are 
completed, the magistrate judge may accept a guilty plea and is bound by 
Rule 11, which sets out the requirements for any judge—magistrate or 
district court—in doing so.24 
A. The Plea Colloquy and Rule 11 
Rule 11 requires the following: “[b]efore the court accepts a plea of 
guilty . . . the court must address the defendant personally in open court.25  
During this address, the court must inform the defendant of, and determine 
 
 16. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58–60 (1982). 
 17. Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631–39 (2012). 
 18. See United States v. Khan, 774 F. Supp. 748, 750 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 19. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2003).  
Currently, five circuit courts of appeal require a recommendation to be sent to the district 
court judge after taking a felony plea.  Id. (explaining that a magistrate judge’s taking of a 
guilty plea, with the litigant’s consent, qualifies as an additional duty under the FMA). 
 20. See United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 432 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 21. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. 
 22. See United States v. Osborne, 345 F.3d 281, 285 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 23. See Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631–639 (2012). 
 24. United States v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886, 888–90 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 25. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1). 
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that the defendant understands” the consequences contained in Rule 11.26  
This open questioning is commonly called the plea colloquy as it involves a 
conversation between the judge and the defendant.27  The open court 
requirement is to ensure that the plea agreement is on the record and, 
thereby, free from the risk of real or apparent unfairness by the attorneys or 
the judge.28 
If a magistrate judge takes the felony plea upon consent, that judge is 
the only one authorized to enter a finding of guilty under Rule 11.29  
Therefore, the magistrate judge who personally addressed the defendant in 
open court must be the one to accept the plea and enter the finding of guilt 
against the defendant.30  While Rule 11 sets out the requirements for the 
magistrate judge in the plea process, the FMA was created to help broaden 
the responsibilities of magistrate judges as well as outline the boundaries of 
their authority.31 
B. The History and Scope of the FMA 
The FMA was enacted in 1968 to create a corps of new judicial 
officers to “cull from the ever-growing workload of the U.S. district 
courts.”32  Congress intended the FMA to permit district courts to increase 
the scope of magistrate responsibilities as part of a plan to establish a 
system capable of increasing the overall efficiency of the federal 
judiciary.33  Congress hoped the FMA would help alleviate the federal 
district courts’ backlog of cases.34  Aware that other non-enumerated duties 
may arise within the federal district courts, section 636(b) was included to 
 
 26. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(A)–(N) (requiring the court to inform the defendant of his 
or her various rights and to ensure the defendant understands such rights). 
 27. Id. 
 28. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1974 amendment. 
 29. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(a) (2012) (stating that a magistrate judge shall have all powers 
and duties conferred or imposed by the Rules of Criminal Procedure). 
 30. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (explaining that the magistrate judge conducts any or all 
proceedings when specifically designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court). 
 31. Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 932 (1991) (articulating the FMA’s policy in 
favor of granting federal judges significant leeway to experiment with possible 
improvements in the efficiency of the judicial process). 
 32. S. REP. NO. 90-371, at 9 (1967). 
 33. Federal Magistrates Act: Hearings on S. 945, H.R. 5502, H.R. 8277, H.R. 8520, 
H.R. 8932, H.R. 9970, and H.R. 10841 Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 90th Cong. 81 (1968) (statement of Sen. Joseph D. Tydings) (“The Magistrate 
Act specifies [those] . . . areas in which the district courts might be able to benefit from the 
magistrate’s services. We did not limit the courts to the areas mentioned.”). 
 34. Id. 
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allow the district courts to delegate a variety of functions to magistrate 
judges.35 
The FMA defines the scope of the duties of United States magistrate 
judges.36  These duties range from entering a sentence for a misdemeanor 
to determining certain pretrial matters before the court.37  Additionally, 
magistrate judges are permitted to preside over misdemeanor trials with the 
parties’ consent.38  Notably, magistrate judges are allowed to undertake 
duties that are not enumerated in the FMA, so long as the duties are 
constitutional.39  “Constitutional” in this context means those duties that 
have not been held to be within the sole domain of Article III judges, such 
as presiding over felony trials.40 
The acceptance of a guilty plea in a felony case is not a described 
power or duty under the FMA.41  Accordingly, answering the question of 
the permissibility of magistrates to do so requires an interpretation of the 
additional duties clause of the statute to determine whether the FMA 
permits judges to discharge that function, regardless of whether the 
defendant and the government have provided consent.42 
C. The Additional Duties Clause of the FMA 
Section 636(b)(3) of the FMA, also known as the additional duties 
clause, authorizes district courts to delegate to magistrate judges “such 
additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of 
the United States.”43  This broad provision was somewhat clarified by the 
United States Supreme Court in Peretz v. United States,44 which held that 
whether a proceeding is one that may be delegated to a magistrate judge 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. United States v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886, 888 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 37. 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(4), (b)(1)(A) (2012); see also David A. Bell, The Power to 
Award Sanctions: Does It Belong in the Hands of Magistrate Judges?, 61 ALB. L. REV. 433, 
433 (1997) (“Magistrate judges are often called upon, for example, to rule on discovery and 
suppression of evidence motions, issue reports and recommendations on dispositive 
motions, adjudicate petty offenses and misdemeanor cases, and even, with the consent of the 
parties, preside over the trial of civil actions.”). 
 38. 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(3); 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b) (2012). 
 39. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3). 
 40. Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 872 (1989). 
 41. Harden, 758 F.3d at 888. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 430 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 
636(b)(3) (2000)). 
 44. Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 933 (1991). 
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depends on whether it is “comparable” to the proceedings that the FMA 
specifically mentions.45 
In order to understand what additional duties are comparable to the 
enumerated duties, it is important to review the Supreme Court’s decisions 
regarding additional duties under the FMA.  In Gomez v. United States,46 
the Supreme Court held that those “additional duties” did not encompass 
the selection of a jury in a felony trial over a defendant’s objection.47  
However, two years later, in Peretz, the Court concluded that a magistrate 
judge may oversee jury selection in a felony case because “a district judge 
may delegate to a magistrate supervision of entire civil and misdemeanor 
trials,” and “[t]hese duties are comparable in responsibility and importance 
to presiding over [voir dire] at a felony trial.”48  Therefore the similarity 
between criminal voir dire and presiding over civil trials (neither of which 
involve a finding of guilt in a criminal case) led to a finding that the FMA 
permitted a magistrate judge to preside over voir dire in a criminal case. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that a magistrate judge is 
not permitted to conduct a felony trial.49  The Supreme Court came to this 
conclusion using the statutory canon of expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius, giving significance to the careful contours of the authority granted 
to the magistrates in the FMA.50  The Court held that the explicit grant of 
authority to preside over civil and misdemeanor cases, should be construed 
as an implicit withholding of authority to preside over a felony trial.51  
While the Supreme Court has addressed felony trials, it has yet to decide 
the issue of magistrate judges’ authority to accept felony guilty pleas.  
Since the issue has been left to the various circuits, each circuit has used 
the Supreme Court’s rulings in Peretz and Gomez to justify its reasoning in 
either permitting or denying magistrate judges the authority to accept 
felony guilty pleas. 
Thus, the district court’s authority to delegate duties to the magistrate 
judge boils down to comparability.52  If an unlisted duty is comparable to 
 
 45. Id. at 931–33. 
 46. Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989). 
 47. Id. at 872. 
 48. Peretz, 501 U.S. at 933. 
 49. Gomez, 490 U.S. at 872. 
 50. Id. (“[T]he carefully defined grant of authority to conduct trials of civil matters and 
of minor criminal cases should be construed as an implicit withholding of the authority to 
preside at a felony trial.”). 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Peretz, 501 U.S. at 933. 
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those duties listed in the Act, that duty may be performed by the magistrate 
judge with the parties’ consent.53 
D. The Role of Consent 
Another important facet is the imposed requirement that the defendant 
first consent for the magistrate to accept his or her plea since the defendant 
has the right to appear before an Article III judge.54  Without consent, the 
analysis of comparability does not come into play because consent acts as a 
“limitation” on the Act’s grant of otherwise “expanded jurisdiction” to 
magistrates.55 
Though the consent requirement is based on the protection of 
individuals’ due process rights, even the most basic rights of criminal 
defendants are subject to waiver.56  “Waiver is the intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right . . . .”57  Relevant here, 
the United States Supreme Court has previously held that litigants may 
waive their personal right to have an Article III judge preside over a civil 
trial.58 
Even in the context of criminal cases, where life and liberty are at 
stake, defendants may waive their rights.  A guilty plea is the quintessential 
waiver: a “guilty plea is a waiver of important constitutional rights 
designed to protect the fairness of a trial.”59  It “is more than an admission 
of past conduct; it is the defendant’s consent that judgment of conviction 
may be entered without a trial—a waiver of his right to trial before a jury or 
judge.”60  However, just as a defendant can consent to an otherwise 
unreasonable search and seizure, a defendant can also give consent to a 
magistrate to waive his right to a jury trial. 
The Supreme Court addressed waiver in the context of magistrate 
powers in Peretz.61  As discussed above, the issue in Peretz was whether it 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 55. Peretz, 501 U.S. at 931  (quoting Gomez, 490 U.S. at 870). 
 56. See, e.g., United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 528 (1985) (holding that absence 
of objection constitutes waiver of the right to be present at all stages of the criminal trial); 
Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 619 (1960) (holding that failure to object to the 
closing of the courtroom constitutes waiver of the right to a public trial); Segurola v. United 
States, 275 U.S. 106, 111 (1927) (holding that failure to object constitutes waiver of the 
Fourth Amendment right against unlawful search and seizure). 
 57. United States v. Venturella, 585 F.3d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 58. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986). 
 59. Johnson v. Ohio, 419 U.S. 924, 925 (1974). 
 60. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). 
 61. Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936–37 (1991). 
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was proper for a magistrate judge to preside at jury selection.  In Peretz, the 
Court said, “[a] defendant has no constitutional right to have an Article III 
judge preside at jury selection if he has raised no objection to the judge’s 
absence.”62  The Court noted that “[t]he defendant’s consent significantly 
changed the constitutional analysis” and found there to be “no Article III 
problem when a district court judge permits a magistrate to conduct [voir 
dire] in accordance with the defendant’s consent.”63 
Falling on the side of judicial efficiency and delegation, the Supreme 
Court concluded that when “the defendant is indifferent as to whether a 
magistrate or a [district] judge should preside, then it makes little sense to 
deny the district court the opportunity to delegate that function to a 
magistrate, particularly if such a delegation sensibly advances the court’s 
interest . . . .”64  Such delegation and efficiency is also served by permitting 
a defendant to consent to a felony guilty plea acceptance by a magistrate 
judge.  Understanding of the consequences of consent is proved when a 
defendant neither files any objections with the district court, moves to 
withdraw his guilty plea, nor objects to the fact that the magistrate judge 
took his plea before the district judge at sentencing.65  Therefore, the 
“additional duty” of permitting magistrates to accept felony guilty pleas 
does not seem to affect the defendant’s substantial rights or impugn 
fairness of judicial proceedings because the defendant knowingly waived 
his or her right by consent.66 
Ultimately, the precedent has shown that one may waive her 
fundamental rights.67  While the Fourth Amendment protects citizens from 
a warrantless search, one may waive that right by simply consenting to the 
search.68  Similarly, here, a defendant has a right to plead guilty to an 
Article III judge, but once she consents to the magistrate’s authority she has 
 
 62. Id. at 936. 
 63. Id. at 932. 
 64. Id. at 934–35 (quoting Gov’t of V.I. v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 311 (3rd Cir. 
1989)). 
 65. See United States v. Cooper, 243 F.3d 411, 412 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that the 
defendant waived objection to the admission of evidence where counsel withdrew the 
motion in limine and offered it into evidence at trial); United States v. Richardson, 238 F.3d 
831, 841 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that the defendant waived objection to the sentencing 
adjustment when the court asked defendant’s lawyer whether he had objected to the 
adjustment and the lawyer said “No”); United States v. Newman, 148 F.3d 871, 874, 879 
(7th Cir. 1998) (holding that the defendant waived arguments by stipulating to facts and by 
expressly declining to press contentions). 
 66. United States v. Ciapponi, 77 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 67. See Johnson v. Ohio, 419 U.S. 924, 925 (1974). 
 68. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). 
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waived any right previously held.69  Therefore, once the defendant 
consents, waiver takes effect and the magistrate may exercise her additional 
duty of accepting the guilty plea as permitted by the FMA. 
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
A. The Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits’ Interpretation 
In the two and a half decades following the Supreme Court’s decisions 
in Peretz and Gomez, several circuits have continued to expand the role of 
federal magistrates in an attempt to ease the burden on the federal judicial 
system.  The Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh 
Circuits have interpreted the additional duties clause in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decisions and concluded that federal magistrates may 
permissibly accept felony guilty pleas with the consent of the defendant. 
In United States v. Benton,70 the Fourth Circuit held, whether or not a 
report and recommendation was filed, a magistrate could accept a felony 
guilty plea so long as the defendant consented.71  The Fourth Circuit, like 
several others, recognized that the guilty-plea colloquy required by the Due 
Process Clause and Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
may be delegated to magistrate judges in felony cases.72  The court viewed 
the acceptance of a plea as “merely the natural culmination of a plea 
colloquy.”73  The court noted that compared to tasks unquestionably within 
a magistrate’s authority, such as conducting felony voir dire and presiding 
 
 69. Peretz, 501 U.S. at 936–37. 
 70. United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 71. Id. at 431. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. (quoting Gov’t of V.I. v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 311 (3rd Cir. 1989)).  The 
court said: 
Certainly, Benton’s distinction between plea colloquy and plea acceptance does 
not appear to necessitate different results under Peretz.  The “comprehensive 
provisions of Rule 11” not only “carefully explain what a court must inquire 
about” and . . .  “what [a magistrate] should determine before accepting a 
plea.” . . . Thus the acceptance of a plea is merely the natural culmination of a plea 
colloquy.  Much like a plea colloquy, plea acceptance involves none of the 
complexity and requires far less discretion than that necessary to perform many 
tasks unquestionably within a magistrate judge’s authority, such as conducting 
felony voir dire and presiding over entire civil and misdemeanor trials.  It is thus 
difficult to see how a plea acceptance is not comparable in responsibility and 
importance to a plea colloquy, and therefore an “additional duty” within the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of 28 U.S.C. section 636(b)(3). 
Id. at 431–32. 
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over entire civil and misdemeanor trials, plea acceptance was much less 
complicated.74 
Other circuits have agreed with the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning.  For 
example, in United States v. Woodard,75 the Eleventh Circuit came to the 
same conclusion, noting that conducting a plea colloquy and accepting 
guilty pleas was comparable to the FMA’s enumerated duties.  The court in 
Woodard added, “conducting a plea colloquy, while important, is ‘less 
complex’ than several of the duties the FMA expressly authorized 
magistrate judges to perform.”76  Moreover, no circuit has held that a 
magistrate judge cannot conduct a plea colloquy.77 
Likewise, the Tenth Circuit relied on Peretz’s analysis of defendant 
consent to potential constitutional violations when it considered a 
magistrate’s acceptance of a plea agreement.78  “[W]hen the defendant 
consents to proceed before a magistrate judge, the constitutional analysis 
changes significantly because no constitutional right is implicated if the 
defendant does not object to the absence of an Article III judge.”79  The 
court went on to say that the “[d]efendant’s failure to object or otherwise 
request review by the district court leaves him in no position to now 
complain that the magistrate judge’s taking of his guilty plea, a proceeding 
to which he expressly consented, violated his constitutional rights.”80 
In consideration of judicial efficiency, the comparability of additional 
duties, and Due Process rights through the requirement of consent, the 
several circuits have, in line with both the purposes of the FMA and the 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, concluded that federal magistrates not 
only have the power to conduct a plea colloquy but also to accept the 
subsequent felony guilty plea. 
B. The Seventh Circuit’s Departure 
Despite the several circuits’ conclusions and their well-founded 
reasoning, the Seventh Circuit’s recent case has challenged the notion that 
federal magistrates may accept a felony guilty plea.  In United States v. 
 
 74. Id. at 432. 
 75. United States v. Woodard, 387 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 76. Id. at 1332–33 (quoting United States v. Williams, 23 F.3d 629, 632–33 (2d Cir. 
1994)). 
 77. Benton, 523 F.3d at 431. 
 78. United States v. Ciapponi, 77 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 79. Id. at 1250 (citing Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991)). 
 80. Id. at 1251; see also Benton, 523 F.3d at 432 (noting “a magistrate judge’s 
acceptance of a plea, with the consent of the parties, does not appear to present any 
constitutional problems, either generally or in this case”). 
11
Hall: The FMA and the Constitutional Validity of Magistrate Judges’ Aut
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law,
142 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:131 
Harden,81 the Seventh Circuit held that the FMA does not permit 
magistrate judges to accept guilty pleas even when the parties consented to 
it.  In its decision, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Peretz, recognizing the FMA does not permit a magistrate judge 
to conduct a felony trial.82  The Seventh Circuit concluded that the 
acceptance of a felony guilty plea is more like conducting a felony trial 
than conducting a misdemeanor trial.83  The court noted, “[t]he task of 
accepting a guilty plea is a task too important to be considered a mere 
‘additional duty’ permitted under § 636(b)(3): it is more important than the 
supervision of a civil or misdemeanor trial, or presiding over [voir dire].”84  
The court went on to point out that “because of this importance, the 
additional duties clause cannot be stretched to reach the acceptance of 
felony guilty pleas, even with a defendant’s consent.”85 
The Seventh Circuit viewed the district court judge as the ultimate and 
the only decision-maker, not to be intruded upon by the federal 
magistrate.86  However, the Seventh Circuit has long allowed a magistrate 
to file a report and recommendation to the district court judge.87  
Additionally, the court recognized the widespread practice of magistrate 
judges conducting a Rule 11(b) colloquy for the purpose of making a report 
and recommendation as permissible.88  This common practice allows the 
magistrate to hear the defendant’s plea and converse with the defendant 
before ultimately recommending his/her opinion for the district court judge 
to ultimately decide.89  However, the court in Harden noted that some 
circuits go beyond this authority and authorize magistrate judges to accept 
guilty pleas without a report and recommendation.90  The Seventh Circuit 
differed on this point and it reasoned that without explicit authorization 
 
 81. United States v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886, 891 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 82. Id. at 890. 
 83. Id. at 889. 
 84. Id. at 888. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 891–92 (“[T]he Court has never suggested that magistrate judges, with the 
parties’ consent, may perform every duty of an Article III judge, regardless of the duty’s 
importance.”). 
 87. Id. at 891. 
 88. See, e.g., United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1119–22 (9th Cir. 2003); 
United States v. Torres, 258 F.3d 791, 796 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Dees, 125 F.3d 
261, 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Williams, 23 F.3d 629, 631–34 (2d Cir. 
1994). 
 89. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. 
 90. See United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 431–32 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. 
Woodard, 387 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Ciapponi, 77 F.3d 1247, 
1250–52 (10th Cir. 1996). 
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from Congress, the district court cannot delegate this vital task to 
magistrate judges.91 
In doing so, the Seventh Circuit dispelled any similarity between a 
plea colloquy and the acceptance of a plea.  In Harden, the court asserted 
that the acceptance of a guilty plea was “dispositive” and required careful 
consideration of the defendant’s understanding of the rights being 
relinquished.92  The court noted that once a defendant relinquishes this right 
it “results in a final and consequential shift in a defendant’s status.”93  
Using this reasoning the Seventh Circuit argued that accepting a guilty plea 
is quite similar in importance to conducting a felony trial, which magistrate 
judges are not permitted to conduct.94 
The Seventh Circuit also took a different stance on the issue of 
consent in felony guilty plea acceptances, reasoning that accepting a guilty 
plea is even more final than a guilty verdict.95  Thus, when accepting a 
guilty plea, “the judge is required to conduct a long searching colloquy, as 
required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b), to ensure that the 
defendant’s waivers of his important rights are ‘voluntary[,]...knowing, 
intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant 
circumstances and likely consequences.’”96  Therefore, the Seventh Circuit 
claimed that “[o]nce a defendant’s guilty plea is accepted, the prosecution 
is at the same stage as if a jury had just returned a verdict of guilty after a 
trial.”97 
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit noted that when a federal official 
performs an “act of consequence” that Congress has not authorized, 
reversal may be required even if the parties consented to it.98  The court 
held that “[t]his narrow exception to waiver and forfeiture is necessary for 
 
 91. Harden, 758 F.3d at 891. 
 92. Id. at 889. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 888–89 (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). 
 97. Id. at 889.  The court explains: 
Unlike the preliminary nature of voir dire—which is an important, but 
preliminary, juncture that will be followed by numerous other substantive 
opportunities to contest the government’s evidence, case, and conduct before any 
determination of guilt—the acceptance of a guilty plea is dispositive.  It results in 
a final and consequential shift in the defendant’s status.  For this reason, the 
acceptance of the guilty plea is quite similar in importance to the conducting of a 
felony trial.  And it is clear that a magistrate judge is not permitted to conduct a 
felony trial, even with the consent of the parties. 
Id. 
 98. Id. at 890. 
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the review of judicial authority to act with consent.”99  The court explained 
that without the exception, “district courts would never know whether the 
[FMA] authorizes them, with the defendant’s consent, to refer [an 
additional duty] to a [magistrate] judge.”100 
However, the Seventh Circuit assumed, albeit incorrectly, that 
Congress has not authorized magistrate judges to accept guilty pleas as part 
of their “additional duties” in the FMA.101  The Supreme Court has noted 
that the FMA evinces a belief that magistrate judges are qualified and 
competent to handle matters that are delegated to them so long as the 
parties consent.102  Therefore, if a defendant perceives any threat of injury 
from the absence of an Article III judge, he need only decline to consent to 
the presence of the magistrate judge.103  However, when the defendant does 
consent to the magistrate’s role, in terms of voir dire proceedings or a plea 
colloquy, the magistrate has jurisdiction to perform this additional duty.104 
Thus, the Seventh Circuit reopened what had appeared to be a closed 
question: the role of the federal magistrate in an overburdened judicial 
system and the tension created with individuals’ Due Process rights. 
III. RESOLVING THE QUESTION 
In light of Congress’ inclusion of section 636(b) indicating the 
presumption of unenumerated duties, the overall efficiency of the expanded 
role of federal magistrates, and the consent requirement, the Fourth, Tenth, 
and Eleventh Circuits’ approach to felony guilty pleas will likely be the 
enduring one. 
The Seventh Circuit’s conservative conclusion was misguided for 
several reasons.  First, it has been long accepted practice within that very 
circuit for a magistrate to conduct a plea colloquy.105  This engaged inquiry 
involves much more discretion and complexity on the part of the magistrate 
than simply accepting a guilty plea.106  Second, the plea colloquy 
essentially leads to the acceptance of a guilty plea.107  Without the plea 
colloquy, the judge—whether magistrate or district court—could not accept 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 890–91. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 935 (1991). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 935–36. 
 105. Harden, 758 F.3d at 891. 
 106. United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 431 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 107. Id. 
14
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [], Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol38/iss1/5
2016] THE FMA AND GUILTY PLEAS 145 
the plea because the judge would have no basis on which to accept it.108  
This shows that the plea colloquy and the plea acceptance are truly 
inseparable.109  Therefore, the acceptance of the guilty plea is very 
comparable with the plea colloquy, and thereby, permissible as an 
additional duty under the FMA.  Finally, the Seventh Circuit’s rejection of 
the consent requirement on the basis of the gravity of the waiver ignores 
the long accepted truth that individuals may waive even their most 
fundamental rights.  For these reasons, the question of the expanding 
powers of the federal magistrate will likely be resolved in accordance with 
the views of the Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. 
Furthermore, there are practical drawbacks to allowing every 
defendant to withdraw his or her guilty plea after a magistrate judge 
accepted it.  As the Benton court notes, defendants will essentially be 
asking for a “dry run or dress rehearsal—a procedure in which a defendant 
can agree to a plea before a magistrate judge, and then withdraw that plea 
without any complaint that the Rule 11 hearing was deficient in any 
way.”110  This has the potential to render plea agreements before magistrate 
judges meaningless.111  Additionally, it would be a complete waste of 
judicial resources when the defendant withdraws his plea for no reason.112  
The proceeding before the magistrate judge would be a nullity and “it may 
encourage defendants to use magistrate-led colloquies as go-throughs in 
order to gauge whether they may later experience ‘buyer’s remorse.’”113 
Lastly, district courts that currently employ magistrate judges to 
conduct plea hearings might feel pressure to revisit their plea procedures.  
This may lead some district courts to stop delegating plea hearings to 
magistrates; however, this would only exacerbate the docket tensions 
already felt by district courts.  These very tensions are what led to the 
creation of the office of magistrate judges.114  Therefore, allowing 
magistrate judges to accept pleas for the purposes of Rule 11 preserves 
judicial resources—the very goal underlying the creation of the office of a 
 
 108. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c), (d), (f) (explaining what a court must inquire about, 
what it should advise a defendant, and what it should determine before accepting a plea). 
 109. Benton, 523 F.3d at 431. 
 110. Id. at 432–33. 
 111. See United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 677 (1997) (noting that “[w]ere 
withdrawal automatic in every case” for any reason, “the guilty plea would become a mere 
gesture, a temporary and meaningless formality reversible at the defendant’s whim”). 
 112. See Benton, 523 F.3d at 432–33. 
 113. Id. at 433. 
 114. United States v. Khan, 774 F. Supp. 748, 750 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (explaining that the 
FMA was enacted to help reduce the district courts’ overwhelming caseload). 
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magistrate judge—and prevents litigants from exploiting bifurcated plea 
procedures. 
CONCLUSION 
Making the district court’s management of cases more efficient has 
gone beyond a mere desire and become a necessity with the growing 
caseload of district courts today.115  Given the burdens of a growing district 
court caseload and the fact that over 97% of criminal convictions result in 
guilty pleas,116  efficiency has necessitated an expanding role for magistrate 
judges.  Within that expanded role lies a greater need for delegation to 
magistrate judges to assist in the practice of guilty plea acceptance.117 
Despite that need, the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the additional 
duties clause of the FMA is in conflict with the opinions of the Fourth, 
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.  Unlike the Seventh Circuit, the several 
circuits interpreted the additional duties clause in light of the Supreme 
Court’s decisions and concluded that federal magistrates may permissibly 
accept felony guilty pleas with the consent of the defendant.  These three 
circuits have all similarly reasoned that overseeing duties such as the plea 
colloquy is analogous to accepting a guilty plea in responsibility and 
importance, and thus, is rightly delegated to a magistrate judge as an 
“additional duty” when the defendant consents.118  Reasoning that “the 
prevalence of guilty pleas [did] not render them less important”,119 the 
Seventh Circuit acknowledged the importance of judicial efficiency but 
declined to adopt its sister circuits’ interpretation.  Instead the Seventh 
Circuit drew an analogy between the importance of a felony trial with the 
gravity of accepting a guilty plea120 and concluded that this duty was not 
within the purview of the additional duties clause of the FMA. 
Ultimately, the only valid concern that remains true today is the 
overburdened caseload of the federal district courts.  Guilty pleas help 
 
 115. United States v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886, 891 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 116. See U.S. District Courts Criminal Statistical Tables For The Federal Judiciary 
Table D-4, in STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 1 (Dec. 31, 2013), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/2013/d
ecember/D04Dec13.pdf [http://perma.cc/PZ3T-AZU6] (finding that of 84,060 total criminal 
convictions in a twelve-month period, 81,955 were the result of guilty pleas). 
 117. See Harden, 758 F.3d at 891 (explaining the desire to promote efficiency in the 
district courts and the prevalence of guilty pleas today). 
 118. See e.g., Benton, 523 F.3d at 432; Woodard, 387 F.3d at 1333; Ciapponi, 77 F.3d at 
1250. 
 119. Id. at 891–92. 
 120. Id. at 888–89. 
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district court judges lighten their caseload and increase the overall 
efficiency of the court system.  Magistrates, in turn, aid these district court 
judges by taking on duties similar to those of their Article III counterparts.  
By denying magistrate judges the ability to accept felony guilty pleas, the 
result will be judicial inefficiency and an inefficient use of magistrate 
judges during the plea process.  In sum, it is clear that the volume of guilty 
pleas will never decrease.  Nevertheless, magistrate judges can help 
alleviate the overwhelming caseload by accepting guilty pleas, consistent 
with the purpose of the FMA. 
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